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Shrinking Civic Space for Human Rights Defenders in
Afghanistan Following the U.S. Military Drawdown in 2014
Abstract
Civic space, an imperative to a democratic society where citizens can exercise their basic
rights, is now under attack in Afghanistan. The fall of the Islamic Emirate in 2001 by a
coalition of the U.S.-led military intervention grounded the rise of a vibrant environment for
civil society and human rights defenders (HRDs). Promoting and safeguarding democratic
values, mainly freedom of speech, assembly, and association, enshrined within a
progressive constitutional framework, had turned to the topic of the day. The heavy
presence of foreign troops with the money influx put strong support behind the nascent
Afghan CSOs, HRDs, and democracy advocates to speak up for the many repressed
Afghans.
However, the drawdown of foreign troops proceeded by protracted political infighting
between Afghan leaders over power-sharing, shaped a grim milestone for civic space and
human rights in 2014. The Afghan security forces had learned but not enough to take full
security responsibility. Meanwhile, the Afghan leaders were wrestling over power in Kabul
while an emboldened Taliban was threatening civic space by making more territorial gains
in provinces. Consequently, the security situation deteriorated dramatically, triggering
widespread public protests. To respond, the government resorted to the use of force
against protesters, and democratic advocates and introduced legal restrictions to prevent
any prospective unrest. Finally, the U.S. military withdrawal has doubled concerns over the
loss of the rights under civic space. Therefore, the United States should stay, not forever,
but until the Afghan peace negotiations succeed.
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Introduction
Civic space is the environment in which citizens, both individually and
collectively, “are able to freely, effectively, and without any
discrimination can exercise their basic rights.”1 As a substratum of an
open and democratic society, civic space allows citizens to claim their
rights and influence the policies that impact their lives. Yet, by holding
its duty, the government is responsible to respect this right and facilitate
the condition in which everyone can organize, participate, and express
themselves without any fear of repression. Recently, however, the rise of
populism, insecurity, and illiberal political figures in various parts of the
world has begun to shrink the civic environment dramatically. From the
post-Soviet states in eastern Europe and Central Asia to South Asia and
Afghanistan, civil society organizations (CSO) and human rights
defenders (HRD), who play critical roles in promoting democratic
values, now experience growing frustration, instability, and conflict.
After the collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001, a relatively propitious
ground for civil society and human rights emerged in Afghanistan.
Despite massive challenges of general insecurity, civil society, and
human rights institutions embarked on their journey to assess the status
of rights of various sections of society. The nascent civil society started
working with a legal, albite deficient, base enshrined in the Constitution
of 2004. Under the Constitution, the Afghan government has the duty to
“form a civil society void of oppression.”2 In practice, however, the civic
environment remains highly precarious for HRDs in the country.
In 2001, the new transitional government drafted the Protest,
Assemblies, and Strike Law, which guaranteed the mechanisms for
peaceful protest. Subsequently, in 2009, the elected government ratified
the Mass Media Law, which provided the population to speak up for
their rights publicly. As a highly conservative society, old-fashioned,
traditional values, and informal social structures have always taken
precedence over formal politics and statutory laws in Afghanistan.
Longstanding cultural impunity and weak government have and
continue to undermine the country's existing legal frameworks. The
perpetrators of violence against HRDs and journalists trespass the laws.
Despite legal protection, both state and nonstate actors, government
officials, illegal armed groups, politicians, security forces, and mafia
groups continue to ride roughshod over civil rights.
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The international community's heavy military and political presence
following the fall of the Taliban gave new momentum to civil activities.
More than 130,000 (including 100,000 U.S. service members) engaged
in a counterinsurgency campaign and began providing training and
advice to the Afghan security forces.3 However, after more than a
decade, the number got down to 20,000 by the end of 2014.4 The United
States-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) coalition started
the security transition process to the Afghan National Defense and
Security Forces (ANDSF) in early 2011 and completed it in late 2014, the
process which took only three years. Nevertheless, the extensive military
reduction of foreign troops created a severe security gap amid the spike
in violence and political instability. The political disputes over the result
of the presidential election, held in 2014, further exacerbated the
situation. The two forerunners, Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah
overturned the results of the presidential elections, which ultimately led
to the formation of an unfaltering power-sharing structure known as the
National Unity Government (NUG).
Five years of NUG was fraught with public discontent, protests, and
security degradation with further erosion of the environment for the
work of journalists, HRDs, and democracy advocates. During this time,
several mass civilian protests took place in the capital Kabul and
provinces, including the so-called Tabasum Movement in 2015,
Enlightenment Movement in 2016, and the Uprising for Change
Movement in 2017. The protests defied the central government's
capacity in managing the demonstrations, which followed by the security
forces' crackdown on protesters, leaving several casualties in place. As a
result, it forced the government to mull over reconsidering the legal
foundations, finding a way to restrict public protests, freedom of
expression, and the press. Therefore, this article aims at exploring the
civic space for the work of CSOs, mainly in post-2014, and how the
military reduction of international troops created a security vacuum,
which led to shrinking civic space for CSOs in Afghanistan. This article
answers the question, how have legal and political measures of the NUG
proceeded by the United States-led military reduction in 2014 impacted
civic space for HRDs and CSOs in Afghanistan?
In response, the research has used qualitative methods, combining
content analysis and in-depth interviews. The literature involved
exploring research reports, journals, books, and Afghanistan’s legal
documents. In addition, in-depth interviews with the local CSOs and
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international experts have generated expertise-based insights and a rich
understanding of the environment for HRDs in Afghanistan.
Given that, the research will first consider the legal context thereby civic
space has flourished and the subsequent limitations it posed after 2014
in Afghanistan. It will then look at the practical challenges, including
economic, funding, political, and security dilemma following the
impetuous reduction in foreign troops after one and half decade since
2001. The article will then reflect on how the U.S. military exit in
September 2021 would impact civic space for the work of Afghan HRDs
and CSOs. Finally, the article concludes by providing policy
recommendations to the international donors for their strategic support
from Afghan HRDs and CSOs, especially in the context of a Taliban
takeover of the entire country.

Civic Space: Legal and Practical Challenges
After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Afghanistan's new political order
provided room for CSOs, as an integral element of a fragile democracy.
The rise of HRDs and social activists advocating for promoting
democratic values is an important achievement of the past twenty years
of international presence. With all its shortcomings, the establishment
of the legal system provided the foundation to regulate civic and human
rights interventions. In the meanwhile, the process has neither been
smooth nor gone unchallenged throughout this period. Legal hurdles,
economic challenges, security, and political implications have and
continue to impact civic space in Afghanistan.

Legal Challenges
Constitutional Context
The 2004 Constitution recognizes the CSOs as the main factor of an
open society, in which citizens can express their thoughts freely and
openly. According to the Constitution, “the people of Afghanistan can
form a civil society void of oppression, atrocity, discrimination as well as
violence, based on the rule of law, social justice, protecting the integrity
and human rights, and attaining people's freedoms and fundamental
rights.”5 Article 34 also stipulates that “freedom of expression is
inviolable and every Afghan has the right to express his thought through
speech, writing, illustration, or other means, by observing the provision
of the constitution.”6 Additionally, Article seven further underpins the
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rights to freedom of expression, which requires the government to abide
by the international conventions to which Afghanistan is a signatory,
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) alike.7
Although the Constitution appears to be progressive, it remains
cautiously and paradoxically conservative. While it requires the
government to observe all the international human rights treaties and
charters to which it is a state party, Article three of the Constitution
resists any law that “contravenes the tenets and provisions of the holy
religion of Islam.”8 The term tenets of Islam are a general and
ambiguous legal phrase, creating leeway and being open to
misinterpretations. Similarly, Articles seven and 34 ensure the rights to
freedom of expression; however, the third Article prohibits any thought
that comes at odds with principles of Islam. Even though the Afghan
government has committed itself to observe the UDHR, Article three is
in direct conflict with Article 18 of the Declaration, which endows
individuals with “freedom of thought and religion.”9 Moreover, Article
six of the Constitution requires the government to protect human rights,
yet, no protection mechanism exists to safeguard the lives of HRDs who
advocate for promoting human rights values and democracy. Many
observers believe that “as the government is entangled with other
challenges, protection of HRDs is not a priority.”10 Therefore, the
contradictions in the Constitution and its failure to protect individual's
rights to freedom of expression, religion, and belief have undermined
the position of HRDs and the state of openness in Afghanistan.
Mass Media Law
As part of the unfolding democratic development, the exponential rise of
media in Afghanistan is a significant achievement of the post-2001 state
building efforts. From limited or no media outlets prior to 2001, the
country now hosts hundreds of private radio and TV stations, with a
panoply of magazines and newspapers circulating regularly. The media
outlets play a critical role in facilitating public debate and shaping public
opinions on different aspects of life.
In 2009, the Afghan parliament approved the country's first-ever Mass
Media Law (hereafter Media Law), a promising step toward
consolidating freedom of expression. Nevertheless, restrictive clauses
and ambiguous terms in the law have increased concerns about
squeezing the rights to freedom of expression. For instance, the
introduction part places emphasis on the role of religion by recalling
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Article three of the Constitution, which makes it impossible for any law
to contradict the principles of Islam.11 Also, Chapter 19 of the law
prohibits the publication of certain materials that contain ambiguities
and limitations. For example, legal phrases such as “contrary to the
principles of Islam” and “promoting religion other than Islam” are not
only in conflict with the spirit of the UDHR but also contradict Article 19
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which
endows everyone with the right to “hold opinions without
interference.”12 In practice, it provides the law enforcement agencies the
latitude to interpret this Article to restrict freedom of expression and the
press.
Moreover, due to widespread culture of impunity and weak law
enforcement, any allusion to sensitive issues, including corruption, land
grabbing, violence against women, and human rights violations,
becomes life-threatening enough to force journalists into selfcensorship.13 Although the stated purpose of Mass Media Law is to
guarantee citizens' right to freedom of thought and expression, those
who strive to promote this right are not safe. It is especially true when
the Law lacks a particular mechanism to protect journalists and media
activists by safeguarding conditions for the free operations of mass
media.
The 2009 Mass Media Law also included a provision for establishing the
Media Complaint Commission within the Ministry of Information and
Culture. Chaired by the minister, the commission primarily served as a
cudgel to intimidate the press and control the media streams under the
pretext of violating media regulations.14 In 2015, following a growing
concern and anger among journalists and media outlets across the
country, the government decided grudgingly to dissolve the commission.
Non-Governmental Organization Law
After 2001, a wide array of non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
emerged to strengthen democratic values and support development
programs in Afghanistan. In 2005, the Afghan government passed a law
on NGOs to promote professionalism and accountability and legalize
NGOs' activities.15 In 2017, however, the government attempted to
amend the enacted NGOs law by introducing several provisions,
draconian enough to restrict the beneficiaries. The decision faced
criticism and opposition from CSOs and human rights activists, calling
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the new amendment highly restrictive and problematic.16 The
modifications below are emblematic of a massive change in the law.
•
•
•

All NGOs shall reregister their organizations every three years.
The government shall refuse to (re) register an organization for
technical reasons.
When holding their annual general assembly, CSOs must invite
the representative of the Ministry of Economy of Afghanistan.17

The proposed changes are not only unclear but also do provide grounds
for misinterpretation. In addition to the burdensome bureaucratic
process, the reregistration clause allows the government to deregister a
CSO that will lead to its automatic removal. Especially, those CSOs who
are critical of the government policies concerning human rights issues
will not be able to operate independently. Similarly, the phrase
“technical reasons” is vague and authorizes the government to avoid
registering organizations that criticize the government on similar topics.
Finally, the proposed changes allow the government to grip an eye on
the work of CSOs and maintain undue influence on their activities.
For CSOs particularly to operate in Afghanistan, they should have a
registration certificate from the Ministry of Economy of Afghanistan.
They must pay tax to the government and report their activities and
register each new project with the Ministry of Economy and other
sectoral Ministries. Therefore, the more restrictive the NGOs law, the
more challenging CSOs activities would become, imposing long back and
forth bureaucratic processes.
Access to Information Law
Public access to information from government institutions has always
been a challenge. Public institutions and their spokespersons were
denying journalists, dependent, and independent researchers access to
official documents and information, an issue which has undermined the
government's obligation to ensure transparency and accountability.
However, in an unprecedented move, in 2018, the Afghan parliament
passed the bill of Access to Information Law as a promising step forward
to boosting transparency and accountability. While previously many
Afghan journalists, CSOs, and HRDs were facing difficulties to access
information from public bureaucrats and officials, the enactment of
Access to Information is a given legal breakthrough in consolidating
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freedom of expression and the press. Article five of the law requires all
institutions to “provide information to applicants and the public.”18
In practice, however, the law remains incomplete and far from
implementation. Most government officials avoid providing information
by circumventing the law. They threaten and intimidate journalists and
individuals who research sensitive cases of corruption, human rights
violations, and allegations of sexual abuse by state actors.19 Therefore,
the government's severe restrictions on state-owned information have
and continue to be a problem. The law safeguards individuals who
disclose sensitive cases related to corruption and violations of human
rights, yet, it fails to outline mechanisms to protect those whistleblowers, which is a sign of discouragement against speaking out.
Another challenge to the effective implementation of the Access to
Information Law is the lack of public awareness of the existence of such
law. Many people have little or no idea of an enforced law as such to
push the authorities to provide them with the requested information.
Lack of public awareness about the law has prevented the citizens from
exercising their legal rights. The government has also failed to conduct
public awareness programs about the importance of the law and the
mechanism by which the citizens would solicit information from state
and private institutions.
The Law on Gathering, Strikes, and Demonstrations
In 2003, the United States-funded political dispensation in Kabul
endorsed Afghanistan's new Law on Gathering, Strikes, and
Demonstrations—hereinafter, Assembly Law. The Assembly Law was in
accordance with Article 36 of Afghanistan's 2004 Constitution, which
endows all citizens with the right to freedom of assembly and association
to express their demands and concerns peacefully.20 It was a promising
step toward promoting human rights and a space of openness, which
allowed the oppressed Afghan public to hold peaceful protests to speak
up for their rights. In the meantime, the Assembly Law embodies
articles, which practically restrict citizens' rights to peaceful
demonstration. For example, according to Article 14 of the Assembly
Law, security forces are authorized to ban protest for security reasons
and resort to force if protesters act otherwise.21 The term security reason
is open to multiple interpretations that provide the security apparatus
the upper hand to restrict protest any time under the banner of an
unfriendly security situation. Resorting to force by police is also at direct
odds with the principle of international human rights documents, to
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which Afghanistan is a state party. Similarly, Article 21 of the Assembly
Law reiterates that “nobody shall organize gatherings, demonstrations,
and strikes during the state of emergency.”22 Yet, the law does not define
the term state of emergency that remains vague and open to
exploitation.
During the NUG from 2014 to 2019, four nationwide mass protests
occurred in the capital Kabul and across provinces, which portrayed the
government's failure in peaceful management of the demonstrations.
The Farkhunda demonstration in March 2015, the so-called Babassum
protest in 2015, two mass protests of the Enlightenment Movement in
2016, and the Uprising for Change protest in 2017 defied the
government's capacity to manage demonstration. Many heavily armed
security forces and riot police poured on streets, blocking all
intersections leading to major squares and centers. Security forces
blocked the main roads, using military equipment and night-shipped
containers to stop protesters from demanding justice, ending
corruption, and improving human rights. During these protests, police
cracked down on protesters, killing and wounding dozens of them.23 The
picture below shows the Afghan police clashing with protesters in June
2017 in Kabul.24
Picture 1.1. Afghan Riot Police Clash with Protesters in Kabul in June
2017

Note: United States Institute of Peace/ Photographed by Mohammad Ismail/ Reuters
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In a similar protest in May 2020, the police killed at least four civilians,
including one journalist, and injured fourteen others in central Ghor
province.25 The incident took place after dozens of civilians had gathered
outside the provincial governor's office to protest the negligence of the
local administration towards poverty-stricken families during the Covid19 pandemic.
Figure 1.1. Three Protest Movements and the Police Response

Source: Author

The protests forced the Afghan National Security Council to mull over
changing the Assembly Law. As a result, in 2017, President Ashraf Ghani
approved amendments to the Assembly Law, making it impossible for
citizens to hold protests. According to the amendments, police reserve
the right to harness technical barriers to block the route to
demonstrators. Also, the new law prohibits demonstrations that create
traffic jams near the government buildings, and in an unusual move, it
restricts any gatherings or sit-ins based on ethnic and religious
sentiments.26 In democracies, ethnic, religious, and other marginalized
segments of society reserve the right to question the government's
discriminatory policies by holding protests or sit-ins to raise their
legitimate voice peacefully. However, the new amendments restrict the
country's minorities such as Hindu, Sikh, Kyrgyz, and other small
ethnoreligious groups, to a large extent, to raise their concerns by
holding gatherings and protests. The measure goes against Afghanistan's
national and international human rights obligations. The decision faced
pushbacks from different Afghan CSOs, Independent Human Rights
Commission, and international donor organizations. Zia Moballegh, a
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high-profile Afghan human rights activist, described the situation as
such:
Given unforgettable lessons from the horrific history of
Afghanistan, people do not accept such repressive laws.
Freedom of expression and the press, and civic
participation are values that guarantee the current
republican system and protect the elected government. Any
attempts to confront citizens by resorting to any means,
especially restricting civic space, are the early stage of
political decline. It will highly likely lead to the formation
of an absolute dictatorship or fall into a possible civil war.27

Practical Challenges to Civic Space
Economic Environment
With an influx of reconstruction funding in Afghanistan, the country
received a tremendous amount of money in foreign aid, spent in
different state and private sectors. Following the new United Statesbacked political dispensation in Kabul, many international philanthropic
organizations, and foreign embassies, along with the UN-affiliated
entities, began donating to and supporting the Afghan CSOs. Their
support ranges across financial largess, political, and capacity building
packages.28 As a result, Afghan CSOs have played critical roles in
promoting human rights values, women empowerment, peacebuilding,
capacity building, advocacy, and governance. And yet, concerns over the
challenges facing by CSOs are mounting. Since their installation in the
post-2001 era, the embryonic Afghan CSOs, as the government itself,
have been heavily dependent on foreign aid. Thus, with the international
community's military drawdown and the security responsibility
transition to local security forces in 2014, there were fears of reducing
foreign aid to Afghanistan, holding back many CSOs, and printing media
operating across the country.29
Over the last two decades, international donors have followed two
different aid provision mechanisms for Afghanistan
1) on-budget and
2) off-budget spending programs.30
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Based on the former mechanism, the international community spent the
donated financial largess through the Afghan government budgetary
programs, while the latter channeled through the development partners
other than the Afghan government, such as the UN agencies and NGOs
operating within the country. Since 2014, however, the shrinking of
foreign aid to Afghanistan and the trend to move a large proportion of
off-budget to on-budget has put Afghan CSOs in financial crisis.31 Given
the nature of dependency on foreign aid and project-driven income,
fluctuation in external aid also impacted the performance and position
of CSOs in Afghanistan.
The reduction in foreign aid has defied the NUG's capacity in financing
its bureaucracies and payments of security servicemen. On the other
side, political instability, security deterioration, and the national
currency depreciation against the U.S. dollar all precipitated a fiscal
crisis toward the end of 2014. To fill the financial deficiency, President
Ashraf Ghani introduced new tax measures in 2015. Among others, these
measures included “doubling the Business Receipts Tax, from two to
four percent, increased levies on imported fuel and gas, a ten percent tax
on mobile phone top-ups, and an increase in the overflight fee for
commercial airlines.”32 The measures also included an increase of tax on
NGOs, shops, supermarkets, and other internal resources that could
generate income as an alternative for external financial compensation.
Consequently, heavy taxation on NGOs, mainly on media with little
government support at the time, crippled many private TV and radio
stations and print media operating primarily in the countryside. As of
August 2017, more than two hundred media outlets terminated their
services due to a financial crisis.33 Afghan journalists called on the
government to fulfill its constitutional obligation by supporting the
media with a tax exemption or tax reduction, as most of the print media,
in particular, have little or no permanent source of income.34
Meanwhile, most CSOs and institutions either downsized the
intervention or closed altogether.35 The continued trend left negative
implications on freedom of expression in the absence of substantial
assistance.
While enmeshed in financial crisis, the outbreak of the novel Covid-19,
with the first positive case documented on February 22, 2020, in
western Herat province of Afghanistan, further squeezed the fragile
Afghan CSOs and society. The pandemic disrupted all aspects of life, as
the phenomenon coincided with ongoing political, economic, and social
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crises in Afghanistan. The novel coronavirus tested the fragile Afghan
governance, socioeconomic structures with a critical question raised
concerning how it would affect the conflict dynamics and the prospects
for intra-Afghan peace negotiations. All local NGOs faced
“unprecedented operational, technical, financial, and safety
challenges.”36 As most NGOs, with CSOs, are dependent entirely on
external donor funding, Covid-19 challenged NGOs to tweak their daily
activities and secure the required financial budget for doing so.37 Months
of lockdown across the major cities restricted physical interaction and
undermined the operational capacities of NGOs. Accordingly, many
lesser-funded NGOs, with little support from the government and
international community during the pandemic, shut down their offices
and or are now on the brink of collapse. To minimize the impact of the
pandemic on the private sector, NGOs have requested the Afghan
government to support them through specific mechanisms such as tax
adjustments; however, the government did not take practical
measures.38
Political Environment
Given the political situation, civil society activists and HRDs enjoy little
support from the state apparatuses, which continues to be a major
problem affecting the enabling environment. In the last two decades,
Afghanistan has proved an unfavorable environment for civil society and
human rights activists.39 Journalists, civil society activists, and HRDs
have been under constant threats from Afghan officials, powerholders,
members of parliament, influential leaders, illegal armed and mafia
groups, such as the Taliban and Islamic State (IS) affiliates. Lack of
government support and financial constraints exacerbated by security
deterioration, mainly in the post-U.S. military drawdown in 2014, have
been among the most pressing challenges civil society has faced.40
Although freedom of expression has been a pivotal achievement of the
last two decades, the growing threats against journalists and media
workers jeopardize this gain. With that in mind, freedom of expression
and the press are currently in a downward spiral with increasing
intimidation and violence from state and nonstate actors amid waning
international assistance.41 Many believe that the Afghan government is
now afraid of an open environment as it provides an enabling space for
citizens to expose what political leaders are doing. Politicians make
constant efforts to mask their corruption scandals, land grabbing,
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human rights abuses, and other malfeasance by restricting the civic
environment. As one civil activist described the situation as such:
Human rights defenders put forward sensitive topics, and
civil society functions as a watchdog to monitor the
government's performance. Therefore, the danger, of
course, will come from anyone whose vested interests are
at risk, including government officials, religious figures,
cultural and political leaders, along with mafia groups.42
As mentioned, civilian protests that took place in Kabul and beyond
exposed the NUG's failure to manage them peacefully. It forced the
executive branch to put in place legal and political restrictions to prevent
civilian gatherings in the future. Introducing new amendments to the
country's Assembly Law, deploying forces mobilized with heavy military
equipment into streets, using water cannons, and shooting the
protesters were among the measures, which effectively controlled the
peaceful demonstrations. In an unprecedented move, the government
banned WhatsApp and Telegram messaging services for twenty days in
2017 during protests by the Uprising for Change Movement in Kabul.
The government labeled it a security measure to stop the Taliban and
other insurgent groups from these encrypted messaging services.43 This
restriction, however, stirred up growing concerns over censorship of
freedom of expression by the NUG. The politically motivated measure
saw widespread pushback from CSOs and human rights activists, and
the government lifted the messaging restrictions as a result.
In 2009, police in Kabul arrested Ali Mohaqiq Nasab, a magazine editor,
and sentenced him to two years imprisonment. The court in Kabul had
convicted Nasab of blasphemy to Islam. In his Article, Nasab had
criticized punishing adultery with 100 lashes and had called for gender
equality under Islamic principles.44 Similarly, in 2012, a court in Kabul
gave Zaman Ahmadi, a writer, and activist, twenty years jail sentence for
his unpublished Article about Islam.45 In Afghanistan, an ultraconservative society, it would be a life-threatening undertaking to
promote and institutionalize freedom of expression.
Over nearly four decades of armed conflict, a deeply ingrained culture of
impunity has emerged, crippling the country's already ineffective
judiciary and legal system. Law enforcement bodies are either incapable
of executing the law or unwilling to do so. Increased violent attacks and
threats against HRDs, civil society activists, and journalists go
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uninvestigated. Consequently, self-censorship has become a means of
survival, both literally and figuratively. Many journalists prefer not to
report on sensitive topics such as corruption, land grabbing, and human
rights abuses to minimize risks.46 In 2018, an assessment report
characterized the civic space as risky for the work of CSOs, and the
United Nations Universal Periodic Review (UPR) had requested the
Afghan government to take practical steps toward improving the
situation. However, the government failed to implement the UPR
recommendations.47 The failures included the inability to ensure
effective investigation and accountability of killing, intimidation,
threats, and violations against journalists, HRDs, and media workers
due to a high level of impunity. 48 As a result, the report rated civic space
in Afghanistan as repressed, reflecting tremendous constraints on civil
society's fundamental freedoms.49
Security Environment: From Military Surge to Drawdown
Aside from the regulatory and political constraints, lack of security
remains a crucial challenge for CSOs and HRDs operating in
Afghanistan. They face constant threats, intimidation, harassment,
kidnapping, and killing, for which both state and nonstate actors are
responsible. Following a short period of partial security across the
country, the United States-led military drawdown in 2014 turned the
security prospects the other way around. Eroding security, political
instability, along with a grim prospect for intra-Afghan peace talks,
define the post-2014 Afghanistan.
In August 2009, General Stanley McChrystal, the newly appointed
United States. and International Security Assistance Force commander,
sent out a situation analysis of Afghanistan. Describing the situation as
severe and deteriorating, the General “recommended a complete
overhaul in strategy to a comprehensive and fully resourced
counterinsurgency” to overcome the security erosion.50 After much
deliberation, the Pentagon ultimately agreed on an international surge
of around 30,000 additional military and civilian personnel, as well as a
considerable increase in the size of the ANDSF.51 The additional
deployment increased the U.S. forces' strength from 67,000 to over
100,000, stepping up the total number of United States-led coalition to
more than 130,000 on the ground. The forces were primarily
responsible for advancing counterinsurgency campaigns on the one
hand and enhancing the capacity of the ANDSF, on the other hand,
making them ready for the mid-2011 transition phase.52 Figure 2 below

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol14/iss3/1
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.14.3.1941

14

Yasa: U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan

shows the surge in foreign troops and a dramatic decline stage in
Afghanistan and Iraq.53
Figure 1.2. Average U.S. Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, Fiscal Years
2002-2016

Note: Congressional Research Service, Troop Levels in the Afghan, and Iraq Wars,
FY2001-FY2012: Cost and other Potential Issues, July 2, 2009, p.9; Congressional
Research Service, Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Iraq and
Afghanistan: 2007-2017, April 28, 2017, pp.4-11; Congressional Research Service,
Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status, February 7, 2017,
p. 19

In July 2010, the United States and its Afghan counterparts created the
Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal (Transition) Board as a mechanism to
provide a geographical assessment of security, political, and economic
dynamics across districts and provinces.54 Both parties agreed on a
condition-based transition that started in March 2011, taking place in
five transition tranches. The transition of security responsibility to
ANDSF ended in December 2013 and took the local forces to take full
security responsibility by the end of 2014.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2021

15

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 14, No. 3

Figure 1.3. NATO Transition Tranches in Afghanistan

Note: SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 30, 2013;
NATO, Inteqal: Transition to Afghan Lead, January 7, 2015.

Nevertheless, the security situation experienced erosion with a dramatic
decline in 2014. The security transition provided the Taliban fighters an
opportunity to intensify their raids by shifting their tactics from rural to
urban centers. In 2015, the Taliban fighters jostled with the government
forces in Kunduz province, overrunning the city center for weeks. During
their takeover of Kunduz's capital, Taliban militiamen conducted houseto-house searches, using a “hit list” to track down their targets, including
journalists, women activists, civil servants, and NGOs’ staff.55 In May
2018, the group captured the capital of Farah province, and three
months later, in August, the center of Ghazni province fell under the
control of the Taliban. Following the United States-Taliban peace deal
signed in early 2020, the group took control of Lashkargah, the capital
of Helmand province, killing and injuring dozens of civilians.56
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Yet, several factors have contributed to security deterioration. In the
first place, the transition took place at a time when the ANDSF were not
prepared to fill the vacuum created because of the drawdown of foreign
troops. Lack of adequate training programs, short terming, insufficient
trainers, along with the absence of long-term military strategy by the
international community for building the capacity of ANDSF produced a
naive local force without readiness to carry out counterinsurgency
independently. The transition within three years further exacerbated the
preparedness of ANDSF in taking security responsibility and could have
provided favorable outcomes otherwise.
Meanwhile, the U.S. political relations with then-President Hamid Karai
deteriorated, with a growing hostility during Obama's first
administration. President Karzai was criticizing the United States for
increasing civilian casualties and not chasing terrorists in their
sanctuaries in Pakistan rather than Afghanistan.57 However, the Karzai
government's huge dependency on the U.S. military and financial
assistance had always put him at an unbalanced political rivalry. Karzai's
only concrete response was his stubborn resistance to signing the United
States-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership agreement, the mission his
successor, President Ashraf Ghani completed.
In 2009, Karl Eikenberry, the former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan,
labeled President Karzai as a leader with “deep-seated insecurity and
non-reliable partner.”58 Given that, the question intriguing one's mind is
which partner has been non-reliable to the other? The disputes between
the United States and Karzai remained unresolved until his final
presidential day in September 2014. The United States was considering
Karzai “as more of a problem than a solution while the President was
feeling undermined by his partners in Washington.”59
In addition, the transition proceeded by a contested political instability
over the result of the 2014 presidential elections in Afghanistan. The two
forerunners, President Ghani and his strident challenger Abdullah
Abdullah disagreed on the result of the elections, which left tremendous
political, security, and economic implications. The two contenders
rejected the result of the elections due to allegations of fraud. The
political deadlock ended when the former U.S. Secretary of State, John
Kerry, stepped in, offering a way out of the electoral standoff, which
plunged the country into a near civil war.60 Kerry's mediation resulted in
the formation of the NUG, gripped with constant obstructions from both
leaders with widespread security backdrops for journalists, HRDs, and
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civil activists on the ground. Both leaders, Ghani as president and
Abdullah as the chief executive of the NUG, remained two political
opponents rather than two political partners within a decaying structure.
Figure 1.4. Triangle of Security Decline Factors in the Post-2014
Afghanistan

Foreign Troops
Withdrawal

U.S.-Karzai
Eroding
Relationship

Political Impasse
of 2014

Deteriorating Security Situation
Source: Author

Consequently, the Taliban gained momentum, and the IS emerged, a
new grim landscape for the work of CSOs. Besides state-imposed
restrictions, the Taliban and IS affiliates began targeting journalists and
HRDs. According to reports, more than fifteen journalists lost their lives
in 2018 in Afghanistan.61 Similarly, reports confirmed the casualties of
twenty-five journalists, political and civil activists in 2019 for which the
Taliban, IS, and unknown gunmen have been responsible.62 Afghan
journalists and activists face constant threats. The Taliban have warned
them repeatedly to cease broadcasting news against the group or face
death. For example, in 2016, the Taliban targeted a bus carrying
employees of the TOLO TV network in Kabul, killing seven journalists.
The group called the attack a retaliation against news aired by TOLO TV
in favor of the Afghan government and its international allies but against
the Taliban.63 The situation further deteriorated following the United
States-Taliban peace agreement signed in early 2020. The Taliban
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resorted to a high spate of targeted killings and assassination of CSOs,
journalists, democracy advocates, physicians, and government officials
by adopting a new strategy.
Over the last twenty years into the conflict, the Taliban have engaged in
guerrilla warfare and indiscriminate suicide bombings. However, after
signing a peace agreement with the United States in February 2020, the
group reduced its conventional suicide attacks; instead, it devised a new
tactic of targeted killings, using homemade sticky bombs placed beneath
the vehicles with a remote-control adjustment capability. Curiously, the
question comes to mind is what makes the Taliban's new tactic special?
Sticky bombs are magnetic improvised explosive devices that stick to the
metal with placement capability beneath the vehicle, becoming an
effective assassination tool during the United States presence in Iraq
and now in Afghanistan.64 Sticky bombs are easy to access, powerful
enough to blow up armored vehicles, lethal, cheap, simple, and with
remote-control and placement capability.65 Packing in a small box with a
magnet and mobile phone, the bomb-maker “programs a number into
the phone and dials it, with the last digit setting off the blast once he is
clear of the targeted car.”66 Therefore, replacing suicide bombings with
this new tactic provided the Taliban with an optimizing tactical
approach to sow terror among Afghans, fueling public discontent by
projecting the government's inability to protect civilians. Moreover,
observers believe that the Taliban seek to leverage their position in the
ongoing intra-Afghan peace talks, using sticky bombs and minimizing
the government's vulnerability.67 Similarly, by targeting CSOs, the
Taliban try to remove the “vanguards of freedom of expression, a vital
stratum of Afghan society that is resisting the Taliban’s return.”68

What Does the United States Withdrawal Mean for Core Civic
Space Rights in Afghanistan?
In 2010, the United States agreed on a condition-based military
drawdown, but now, the country is leaving in September 2021, based on
a timeline set by the Biden Administration. The so-called United States
counterinsurgency in Afghanistan has experienced many ebbs and flows.
The mission started with a coalition in 2001, continued with a surge in
2009, fluctuated with drawdown five years later, and now, it is going to
end by September 2021. Whatever the United States and its Western
allies achieved or lost in Afghanistan, the question now is what their
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September farewell means for democratic gains amid a bleak political
horizon looming over the country.
In February 2020, when many countries around the world were
struggling with the side-effects of the novel Covid-19, the United States
signed a peace agreement with the Taliban to forge a political settlement
in Afghanistan. The United States-Taliban peace agreement provided “a
14-month withdrawal timeline of all the U.S. troops conditioned on the
Taliban preventing all terrorist groups from using Afghan territory to
threaten the United States and its allies.”69 The deal also urged the
Taliban to join in direct talks with the United States-backed government
in Kabul while not binding the group to take down the level of violence
and or recognize the Kabul government as a legitimate dispensation.
Although the Taliban stopped attacking foreign troops, the killing of
Afghan officials, journalists, and CSOs members became a central point.
Shortly after his inauguration in January 2021, President Joe Biden
undertook the review of the U.S. engagement strategy in Afghanistan.
Initially, his electoral success had restored the waning aspirations of
Afghan leaders over the new possible U.S. strategy to Afghanistan.
Because Trump's set timeline of the United States withdrawal in May
2021 had created growing frustrations over an irresponsible exit, which
President Biden should have fixed it. However, in March 2021, President
Biden outlined a three-part peace contour for Afghanistan, with a
delayed complete military withdrawal from May 1 exit deadline that the
then-President Trump had negotiated, to September 2021.70
Nevertheless, fears are growing among Afghans over a Taliban takeover
or a possible civil war if the fragile intra-Afghan peace negotiations do
not provide favorable outcomes. While the intra-Afghan peace talks
kicked off in September 2020, the Afghan government and the Taliban
have not yet made tangible progress. Multiple sticking points, such as
the nature of the future political structure, an agreed-upon constitution,
minorities, and women's civil, political, and economic participation,
have remained unresolved on the table. The Taliban have constantly
placed emphasis on the formation of an Islamic system; however, the
group has not yet defined what that means as the current Afghan
government is following the Islamic principles enshrined in the
Constitution.71 Twenty years since the collapse of the Islamic Emirate of
Taliban have provided enormous opportunities, especially in promoting
core civic space rights such as the rights to freedom of association,
freedom of peaceful assembly, and freedom of expression, all defined

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol14/iss3/1
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.14.3.1941

20

Yasa: U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan

within a progressive constitutional framework. Human rights of
minorities and women improved unprecedentedly with the latter making
21 percent of the labor force and holding 69 seats out of the total 250
seats in the parliament.72
Picture 1.2. Afghan Female Members of Parliament

Note: 8AM Newspaper/ Photographed by the Afghan Parliament Media Department

Yet, observers argue that with the United States complete withdrawal in
September 2021, if the intra-Afghan peace talks fail to result in an
inclusive and sustainable peace, democratic gains will vanish, and
Afghanistan will plunge into another conflict.73 This major concern is
because the Taliban would take advantage of the security vacuum after
the U.S. military withdrawal, trying to re-establish a similar theocratic
Islamic regime as the group imposed in the 1990s. The Taliban are still
psychologically vindictive, mentally radical, and behaviorally brutal as
their practices in the areas they controls do not inspire confidence that
the groups’ views on human rights have evolved since the 1990s.74

Conclusion
Following the new political establishment in 2011, there was growing
hope for creating a conducive civic space for the work of civil society and
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human rights organizations in Afghanistan. This hope came into being
with the financial and political support of the international community
to the nascent Afghan CSOs. The heavy military presence of the United
States-led coalition improved the security situation, a critical prop up for
the practical intervention of CSOs in upholding democratic values.
However, the shrink of international troops and their financial
assistance in 2014 led to a grim milestone for CSOs and heralded a
deteriorating security posture impacting the state of openness for
human rights activists.
Apart from that, protracted political infighting between President Ashraf
Ghani and his formidable electoral challenger, Abdullah Abdullah,
further exacerbated the situation, which provided a recipe for the
Taliban's exploitation of the situation. The group started seizing more
territories while the Afghan political leaders were wrestling over power
sharing; the political bargaining, which was domestically destructive and
strategically crippling enough. The government trapped in a mazelike
crossroad. On the one hand, the government had to resolve its internal
conflict, and on the other hand, should it respond to growing violence,
which was escalating because of a considerable drawdown of foreign
troops. However, the government failed to manage either. As a result,
the situation prompted widespread public discontent that led to mass
protests against the government in Kabul and beyond. In response, the
government undertook a crackdown on civilian gatherings and amended
the legislation with a temporary ban on social media to prevent any
social unrest in the future.
In addition, the security vacuum fed the emboldened Taliban, and an
emerging IS, along with other illegal armed groups, extending their
geographical areas by pushing back the government forces. The fall of
Kunduz, Ghazni, Farah, and Helmand provinces are emblematic of
broader territorial gains by the Taliban, who dismantled NGO offices,
arrested, and killed dozens of human rights activists, HRDs, and civil
employees while besieging the cities. Therefore, the ANDSF are bogged
down in a war of attrition, which according to President Ghani, “more
than 45,000 Afghan security forces have lost their lives since 2014.”75
The ongoing sluggish intra-Afghan peace talks have increased concerns
over Afghanistan's loss of democratic gains. If the peace process
preserves human rights values, such as women's rights, freedom of
expression, media, civil society, and civil and political participation for
all, and for women, in particular, would be a step forward and would
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relapse into another conflict otherwise. The United States complete
military withdrawal by September 2021 has further exacerbated hopes
for sustainable peace. The United States should stay, not forever, but
until the intra-Afghan peace negotiations come to a success. Otherwise,
the fundamental rights such as freedom of speech, assembly, and rights
to association guaranteed under civic space will go in vain, resulting in a
loss of all democratic achievements gained over the last twenty years.
Second, the international community should make all its assistance to
Afghanistan conditional on the preservation of civic space, human
rights, civil society, and women's social and political participation.
Third, the international community, mainly the United States, should
put pressure on the Taliban to deescalate violence and halt the killing of
CSOs and democracy advocates. Fourth, the international community
should require the Taliban to respect human rights, those of women and
minorities under the areas of their control as proof of the group’s claims
to have changed on human rights issues. Finally, the international
community should hold the Afghan government, as a duty bearer, to
comply with its international obligations by ameliorating the legal and
practical situations for the work of CSOs in Afghanistan. Only then, the
rights under civic space and other democratic values would sustain for
years to come in Afghanistan.
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